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Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist, Neo Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost 
Certainly False; Thomas Nagel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 128 pp. + 
index. $24.95 hc. ISBN 978-0-19-991975-8 
 
 
 
In some ways, this is an important book. In some ways it is a very disappointing one. It is 
important — one is tempted to add: “obviously”— because it raises a series of philosophical 
concerns that are very deep. Indeed, perhaps it is truly not possible to wonder about the 
adequacy of the naturalist accounts we are familiar with on a more fundamental level than 
that taken up by Nagel. It is very disappointing because, surprisingly, after all these years, 
there is remarkably little exploration of the degree to which these problems, or their 
apparent profundity, may be driven by a conception of “explanation” that is quite 
idiosyncratic and by no means right. I am not saying that the conception of “explanation” 
that Nagel employs to bludgeon naturalism is wrong. Not yet. I am saying that there is 
virtually no attention to the question as to whether it might be, or, more subtly, whether it is 
something of a construction, by no means a natural or transparent fact in the world. The 
subtitle of Nagel’s book, as everyone must surely know, is “why the materialist neo 
Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false.” When one thinks about the 
conception of explanation that drives so much of the argument (for it is against that 
conception of course that materialism, naturalism and Darwinian accounts all fail), one is 
tempted to add to the subtitle: “if you have a sensibility like mine.” Again, it may be that the 
conception Nagel relies on is defensible, or the right one. I am disinclined to think so, of 
course, and why I think this will occupy us below. But that is a separate matter. At the least, 
there is a substantive gap in the argument: what clearly should have been examined is not. 
The background assumptions that underwrite what counts as a good or adequate explanation 
are not subjected to any critical scrutiny. And this is a deeply frustrating fact. When the 
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reader finishes this book, chances are, he or she will be wondering most aggressively about 
what Nagel has not talked about.  
 
I think there is a certain amount of mystery attending the idea — not just Nagel’s idea, but 
any idea — of “explanation.” By this I mean: that there is just no way the contingencies of 
nature can ever appear to be anything but, well, contingent; they will never quite 
approximate, let alone replicate, the transparency we think we have in abstract conceptual 
argument. That is not nature’s problem. In time, it may not even be ours. We may be like 
teenagers gripped, now, by the fact of our mortality, and in time we may just get over it.  
 
Actually, I think there are significant bits of the philosophical community who are in that 
more mature place right now. From what I can gather, almost all of the scientific community 
is. That is, most if not all scientists I know find it hard to understand just what Nagel is so 
exercised about, just what is so terribly wrong with the sort of explanation the naturalist, 
particularly when within biology, hopes to offer. Consciousness may indeed be very hard to 
explain. So is the origin of the universe, or even, for that matter, what it means to speak of 
the universe as “beginning,” or “having boundaries” (which talk of the origin of the 
universe must implicate). But consciousness is impossible to explain(N), where 
“explain(N)” is “explain” as Nagel understands it. That follows from “explain(N)” as much 
as it does from anything special about consciousness. And so for this argument to work, we 
need to be persuaded that “explain(N)” is really the right way to understand the idea of 
explanation, is somehow instinct in the ordinary conception, or presupposed in whatever 
conception may be taken as largely non-controversial. My complaint at this point is not that 
Nagel’s argument to this effect is not as convincing as it needs to be. My complaint is that 
this issue, this argument, is not taken up at all in Mind and Cosmos. I think this is because 
the conception of explanation that drives Nagel, underwriting his dissatisfaction with any 
neurological explanation of our conscious states, just seems so natural, so obvious to Nagel 
that it is unnecessary to explore it. And this is a mistake. It is very much not. To the extent 
the reader feels that the conception of explanation that Nagel employs is artificial or 
idiosyncratic, to that extent the reader will also be unconvinced by Nagel’s argument that 
consciousness cannot be satisfactorily explained.  I think there may be quite a few more 
readers of this sort out there than Nagel appreciates.  
 
In what follows I will begin by rehearsing Nagel’s argument against materialism as it 
applies to consciousness. However, as the remarks above suggest, because this argument is 
intertwined with a certain conception of explanation, what an explanation should be like, 
that conception will be our subject there too. There are other arguments in Mind and 
Cosmos regarding other things, arguments against materialist or naturalist accounts of 
intentionality, rationality and moral value too. Indeed, when Nagel’s arguments are all laid 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                                   Ross | 199 
 
 
 
out, one might reasonably ask what the materialist account is not embarrassed by, why 
everything not enumerated in a physics text book is not added to the charge sheet. Is it 
merely consciousness, intentionality, rationality and moral value the materialist fails to 
explain? Why not post-modernism, tragedy, negligence, jokes and Oklahoma! as well? 
Perhaps this last remark is unfair — on any account, Oklahoma! is probably a miracle. But 
it does seem the materialist has much to be ashamed of.  That is, if the demands Nagel 
makes upon his argument can be justified. 
 
Let us start with some remarks of Nagel’s.  
 
But if the mental is not merely physical, then it cannot be fully explained by 
physical science. And then, as I shall argue, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
those aspects of our physical constitution cannot be fully explained by physical 
science either. If evolutionary biology is a physical theory—as it is generally taken 
to be—then it cannot account for the appearance of consciousness and of other 
phenomenon that are not physically reducible. So if mind is a product of biological 
evolution—if organisms with mental life are not miraculous anomalies but an 
integral part of nature—then biology cannot be a purely physical science. (14, 15) 
 
It is trivially true that if there are conscious organisms capable of reason, the 
possibility of such organisms must have been there from the beginning. But if we 
believe in a natural order, then something in the world that eventually gave rise to 
rational beings must explain this possibility. Moreover, to explain not merely the 
possibility but the actuality of rational beings, the world must have properties that 
make their appearance not a complete accident: in some way the likelihood must 
have been latent in the nature of things. …Such an explanation would complete the 
pursuit of intelligibility by showing how the natural order is disposed to generate 
beings capable of comprehending it. (86) 
 
To qualify as a genuine explanation of the mental, an emergent account must be in 
some way systematic. It cannot just say that each mental event or state supervenes 
on the complex physical state of the organism on which it occurs. That would be a 
kind of brute fact that does not constitute an explanation but rather calls for an 
explanation…I think we can imagine a higher order psycho-physical theory that 
would make the connection cease to seem like a gigantic set of inexplicable 
correlations and would instead make it begin to seem intelligible…Still, this kind of 
higher-level theory, however empirically accurate, seems unsatisfactory as a final 
answer to the constitutive question. If emergence is the whole truth, it implies that 
mental states are present in the organism as a whole …without any grounding in the 
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elements that constitutes the organism, except for the physical character of those 
elements that permits them to be arranged in the complex form that, according to the 
higher level theory, connects the physical with the mental. That such purely physical 
elements, when combined in a certain way, should necessarily produce a state of the 
whole that is not constituted out of the properties and relations of the physical parts 
still seems like magic, even if the higher order psychophysical dependencies are 
quite systematic. (55, 56)   
 
The existence of consciousness is both one of the most familiar and one of the 
most astounding things about the world. No conception of the natural order that 
does not reveal it as something to be expected can aspire even to the outline of 
completeness. (53) 
 
Suppose there were a general psychophysical theory that…would allow us to 
understand for any type of physical organism why it did or did not have conscious 
life, and if it did, why it had the specific type of conscious life that it had. This could 
be called a non-historical theory of consciousness. It would accomplish task (1) [it 
would explain why specific organisms have the conscious life they have]. But I 
believe that even if such a powerful non-historical theory were conjoined with a 
purely physical theory of how those organisms arose through evolution, the result 
would not be an explanation of the appearance of consciousness as such. [!] It would 
not accomplish task (2) [explaining why conscious organisms arose in the history of 
life on earth]. It would still leave the appearance of consciousness as an accidental 
and therefore unexplained concomitant of something else—the genuinely intelligible 
physical history. (51)  
 
I hope the reader gets the idea. Powerful, suggestive, strikingly original thoughts run 
alongside some very extraordinary, and questionable, claims. Following Nagel, let’s 
distinguish first between historical explanations and constitutive ones. Historical 
explanations seek to show why some state of affairs occurred in time, or at a particular 
moment in time. When we try to explain why the dinosaurs disappeared however many 
millions of years ago, we give a historical explanation. Constitutive explanations seek to 
identify the timeless causal story as it were; the causal law. When we try to explain why 
plutonium deteriorates and sand does not, we give a constitutive explanation.  
 
Running like a thread through both conceptions of explanations however is this idea that an 
explanation, to be satisfactory, must present the outcome as prefigured, as instinct in the 
antecedent state of affairs, whether this is understood as antecedent in time, or within the 
framework of some temporally neutral causation story. When this requirement is imposed 
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on historical stories, the result is that there can be no place for contingency in any such 
story. When this requirement is imposed on any temporally neutral causal story, we cannot, 
by definition as it were, help but find any talk of higher order or emergent properties 
fundamentally mysterious. (Since, by definition, such properties are not to be found or 
prefigured in the underlying ones—that’s why we call them “higher order.”) And so, with 
one blow, Nagel has robbed us of two of the most reliable and useful tools in our 
explanation-story tool box—the possibility of introducing contingency into our historical 
stories (“because the asteroid happened to hit the earth, the dinosaurs disappeared”) and the 
possibility of explaining phenomena by reference to higher order properties that do not 
translate or reduce to whatever material components happen to instantiate such properties 
(“he left the room because he was bored”).  It should be no surprise that so much of the 
world around us now threatens to become so mysterious! 
 
Analogous points apply to analogous ideas. To be sure, there is a sense in which “the mental 
is not merely physical.” But Nagel does not say which among the many senses on offer he is 
actually committed to here. There is the original, “classic,” Nagel, the very ambitious story 
first put forward in “What Is It Like To Be A Bat?”: that there are “subjective facts” out 
there beyond the reach of any objective story. Nagel wisely refrains from making that 
argument again, for to speak of “facts” that are “not part of the objective world” is to be 
committed to epiphenomenalism; such facts cannot then be said to have any causal potency 
— something Frank Jackson was honest enough to see and foolish enough to defend. For 
surely if it isn’t the way the sunset looks that causes me to pull over and get a better look at 
it, or if it isn’t the way the whiskey tastes that causes me to have another sip, then 
everything I know is false and it’s the end of the world. Perhaps all this really means — that 
“the mental is not merely the physical”— is that once the naturalistic property story has 
been completed, there is still a further thing to talk about, our experience of such properties, 
and what that is like. There is having a headache, being in physical state M, and then there 
is the way the headache feels, and how we would describe the way it feels. Sure; fine. But it 
hardly follows from this, i.e., that there is this further thing to speak about, that this thing we 
speak about is not amenable to a physical explanation. Consider: our responses to 
Schumann are “not merely physical” either (in this second, innocuous sense — they can 
hardly be described or captured in purely physical property talk), but there almost certainly 
is a very good empirical explanation for why this jumpy music, with its unexpected key 
changes, causes the particular responses that it does. It hardly follows from the fact that the 
thing in question must be described in an irreducibly non-physical vocabulary that the 
properties such vocabulary speaks of (“the jumpy, nervous tension you get when listening to 
Schumann’s music” for example) cannot be helpfully located and explained by reference to 
the physical story that seems to generate them.  
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But Nagel goes further. Naturalistic explanations must be of a certain kind; if they are not, 
then they are not really good explanations at all. Since in the end, the world is through and 
through physical (in the naturalistic world view we are considering), the language of 
naturalistic explanation must tie directly to the language of physics. Any other sort of 
property talk is suspicious, unsatisfactory. Recall:  
 
That such purely physical elements, when combined in a certain way, should 
necessarily produce a state of the whole that is not constituted out of the properties 
and relations of the physical parts still seems like magic, even if the higher order 
psychophysical dependencies are quite systematic. (55, 56) 
 
That remark, “seems like magic,” for me, truly gives the game away. For here we get to the 
heart of the strangeness of the argument — a conception of explanation in virtue of which 
higher order properties, properties that do perfectly good work in explanatory stories, come 
to be deemed intrinsically mysterious. Their use, and our reliance on their use, cannot really 
be justified because they fail to be prefigured in the material story that underlies them. 
They are “magic” (why not say “voodoo”?). If higher order properties are “magic,” just so 
much hand waving, not part of genuine scientific talk, it is no surprise then that the sciences 
will be described, in Nagel’s hands, in ways that leave such properties out. And so it is also 
then no surprise that we wind up with a characterization of biology that is through and 
through materialist, reductive, an off shoot of physics (it could not be a “real” science any 
other way). Thus, Nagel cannot see how it is just these sorts of properties that make biology 
non-reductive now. Consider “parasite” or “symbiosis,” or “function” or “fitness” or 
“selection” or “sex” (there is a much longer list, but this will do for a start). All of these 
terms do perfectly good work in all sorts of explanatory stories; none of them, needless to 
say, are reducible to physics, and so can be thought of as prefigured in any purely material 
story of the sort the physicist would tell. Nagel may be right that a purely materialist or 
reductive story will not be satisfactory, but Fodor made this point years ago. And, following 
Fodor, biology has been instantiating this point for far longer.  
 
Of course, there are a great many puzzles surrounding our presumably legitimate talk of 
such properties. But then this is the issue that must be taken up in some detail — what is the 
status of the special sciences, what is the status of these “natural kind” terms that do not 
reduce to any disjunction of their physical instantiations? How can we make sense of these 
terms, or if we are realists about such stuff, these properties, that do, apparently, underwrite 
so many perfectly good predictions and counterfactuals and yet resist “translation” into the 
language of physics? Obviously, if consciousness (or rationality or intentionality) is to be 
explained in any way, it will be via some pretty heavy reliance on properties of this sort. 
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Ruling them out from the start as insufficiently well-bred to be a part of “proper” science 
gets us nowhere.  
 
Two further, final points: Nagel often says that a good historical explanation of 
consciousness would show how it is that consciousness (or rationality or intentionality) was 
inevitable. And it is just this that the present stories fail to do. Given the fundamental 
particles plus the fundamental forces as material science presents these, there is no way 
consciousness can be seen to be in any way inevitable or necessary. This is true; given the 
fundamental physical story at say the time of the big bang, consciousness is anything but 
“inevitable.” But Nagel should pause and consider how rare such things are in the universe. 
We have no evidence of consciousness or intentionality anywhere else. One might say: to 
the contrary, any account that presented consciousness (say) as the inevitable result of 
fundamental forces would face the daunting difficulty of explaining why it was not more 
commonly found everywhere. Nagel never considers this difficulty. A healthy sense of the 
near miraculous nature of the thing to be explained braided into our explanations would 
appear to be more faithful to the data.  
 
Finally, there runs throughout Mind and Cosmos a largely unexamined distinction 
regarding different sorts of causal explanations. Perhaps it might be more accurate to say 
this is a distinction in Nagel’s attitude towards different causal explanations. Some causal 
explanations seem to Nagel to be essentially transparent. The outcome, given the 
antecedent conditions and the relevant laws, seems undeniable, and undeniably necessary. 
Causal accounts of why water freezes at a certain temperatures given its molecular 
structure provide a standard example. By contrast, other causal claims seem “brute,” 
murky, and saturated with contingency. Claims about consciousness or intentionality 
supervening upon certain sorts of systems or types of organic material would seem to be 
like this. The first (no surprise) is a real explanation in good standing. The second is very 
much not. And indeed, it is because of this, the inadequacy of the second sort of 
explanation, that Nagel even considers adding to the naturalist story some sort of atomic 
mental component there from the beginning, a kind of mental monad. (This is what he 
means when he says in the remark above that biology then cannot be a purely physical 
science.) Nagel concedes the obscurity of the idea and does not seriously defend it, but 
that he introduces it at all shows how Nagel conceives “transparency” in explanations. 
Whatever disadvantages to this move there might be, at least then the consciousness we 
get at the end of the story would be generated by components credited with some sort of 
mental nature from the start. We would have the kind of explanation that we must always 
ask for — I am tempted to add: a near medieval one, where nothing that is not “contained” 
in the premises can find its way into the conclusion.  
 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                                   Ross | 204 
 
 
 
I am not saying that our accounts of consciousness and our accounts of how it is that 
water has the properties that it has do not differ in any way. My complaint is rather that 
Nagel does not take up the degree to which these differences may rest on something else 
besides some enduring metaphysical fact. I am happy to concede that the connection 
between the properties of water molecules and the fact that water freezes at a certain 
temperature does seem “transparent” to us, inevitable and even necessary, and that the 
connection between certain underlying organic material and consciousness seems 
anything but. Fine. But it is not clear that this sense of things, this sense of a difference, 
is tied to a defect in the second sort of explanation or to any difference in actual 
contingency. Perhaps the sense of transparency or necessity we feel when offering the 
first sort of story stems from the wealth of additional theory it is tied to, the many 
explanations it seamlessly connects up with, and so forth. We are comfortable with these 
claims, and we can elaborate upon them endlessly. But they are still thoroughly 
contingent for all that. They do not name logical or conceptual connections, the 
perfectly legitimate Quine-like maneuver of our deciding to treat them as such once 
they are well established notwithstanding. (“By ‘water’ I just mean ‘H2O’”. And of 
course one can talk this way if one wants to.) Perhaps, with the elaboration of further 
theory concerning neurology and consciousness, the sense of asymmetry across these 
cases might well disappear; it might certainly significantly diminish. Perhaps the 
contingency that is always there in all causal claims will come to seem less interesting, 
less important. When the connections are sufficiently systematic, when the predictions 
and counterfactuals sufficiently robust, the easy going back and forth between causal 
and conceptual claims we have with all well-established science may well arise here too. 
Of course, I cannot know this. But Nagel argues from a position that takes a certain sort 
of felt difference when looking at these two stories as revealing a deep, never to be 
altered fact about the world, or about our ability to explain bits of it. And this move 
from an inner sense to an objective fact is precisely what must be taken up and 
defended. Nagel really seems to have forgotten how contingent causal explanation is 
everywhere. We can just get very good at tracing out the consequences of our contingent 
universe with systematic brio. Also — and this is another point Nagel never takes up — 
our consciousness is of course very closely tied up with our identity, with who we are. 
Any causal explanation here will always risk a sense of vertigo. Causal explanations of 
love are not so dissimilar. They seem at odds with the felt depth of the phenomena as 
experienced. This is not to be denied. But we have come to be quite at ease (in a way an 
earlier generation of Victorians would not have been) with the idea that love, for all its 
sense of felt magic, might very well have deep roots in our biology and admit of a very 
robust causal explanation. Nagel may well be the eminent Victorian of our time.     
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Value 
 
The conception of value that Nagel defends in Mind and Cosmos, and his argument for why 
this conception poses a problem for a Darwinian account, is not likely to receive much 
independent attention. But for anyone interested in meta-ethics, his views on these matters, 
as they are put forward here, are fascinating. Nagel was for me at one point one of the most 
subtle, and helpful, writers on how to think about morality and moral objectivity. Here he 
defends a position that is flatly incredible. 
 
Nagel begins in exactly the right place. He is, to use the vexed terminology of our day, a 
“realist” about value, but he notes that the right way to be a realist is to be a certain sort of 
autonomist, to resist the idea the world needs any further thing to make certain sorts of 
evaluative claims true. The subjectivist and the quasi realist hold that evaluative claims are 
to be explained by reference to certain kinds of psychological states, attitudes, or “stances.” 
This is a mistake. Certain moral claims (I put it this way because not all claims about moral 
matters will have this status) are true in virtue of their content, in virtue of what they 
represent as important, and in virtue of the connection such claims have to similar claims 
that admit of justification in a similar way. The idea that truth or justification here requires 
any sort of additional “ontology” is a pernicious one — the subjectivist easily, and cheaply, 
looks good by smugly rejecting this artificial requirement — and must be strenuously 
rejected.  Nagel writes: 
 
The dispute between realism and subjectivism is not about the contents of the 
universe. It is a dispute about the order [or nature—SR] of normative explanation. 
Realists believe that moral and other evaluative judgments can often be explained by 
more general or basic evaluative truths together with the facts that bring them into 
play…But they do not believe the evaluative element in such a judgment can be 
explained by anything else. That there is a reason to do what will avoid grievous 
harm to a sentient creature, is, in a realist view, one of the kinds of things that can be 
true in itself, and not because of something of different kind is true…But although 
realism does not add anything to the catalog of entities or properties that a 
subjectivist believes to exist in the world, it does hold that certain truths that 
subjectivists think have to be grounded in something else do not have to be so 
grounded but are just true in their own right. (102, 103) 
 
So far; so good. Indeed, I think this is in fact an excellent statement of how the realist 
conceives of justification. But then Nagel turns to something else entirely: how might our 
ability to grasp true moral claims, something we undeniably can do, fit with a 
fundamentally Darwinian account of our development? Nagel draws on the arguments of 
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Sharon Street here, and like Street, he finds a problem where there is none in part by 
construing “moral truth” in excessively Platonist ways (a claim I hope to make clearer in the 
discussion that follows). Street thinks the plausibility of the Darwinian account poses a 
problem for moral realism — how could we think that the story that explains how it is that 
we cherish our children, bond in tribes and shun promise breakers (the raw material that we 
then construct into collective life) also just happens to deliver creatures that can detect 
moral truths that, if we are realists, we must think of as independent of our psychological 
states? It seems incredible, and, from a Darwinian point of view, pointless. It does not 
matter from a Darwinian point of view whether pain is really bad and pleasure is really 
good. Pleasure might, however it appears to us, be bad, pain good, or both valueless. Value 
realism, whatever is truly true apart from how things appear, is irrelevant to that story. All 
that matters is that pain avoidance plays a role in how we have adapted to the world. The 
true evaluative status of pain, if it even has one, has no bearing on the Darwinian account of 
how we have come to regard pain as we do, of how we have come to get along. This is very 
much unlike the factual story. Here it is crucial, if our story is to reach its happy ending, that 
the way things appear is pretty much exactly how they are. If our spatial representations 
were not essentially accurate, we would fall off cliffs, not snare game, and fall into the paws 
of saber tooth tigers. But value realism, unlike empirical realism, plays no role in the 
adaptive story. Nagel more or less agrees to this account of the conflict, but then argues to 
the opposite conclusion: given that we can grasp such truths, and that such truths, 
understood as independent of our habits, are irrelevant from the standpoint of a Darwinian 
story, there must be more to the story than what the Darwinian can say.  
 
[T]he natural Darwinian explanation of the motives and dispositions that form the 
starting points of our value judgments and which we can then modify through the 
process of reflective equilibrium is that they have contributed to reproductive fitness 
not only by aiding individual survival but by promoting the nurture and care of 
children, deterring aggression and making social cooperation possible. The mind 
independent truth of the resulting judgments has no role to play in the Darwinian 
story; so far as natural selection is concerned, if there were such a thing as mind 
independent moral truths, those judgments could be systematically false. (107) 
 
A Darwinian account of visual perception entails that it gives us information about 
the external world and that the evil demon hypothesis is false. A Darwinian account 
of the origin of our basic desires and aversions by contrast has no implications as to 
whether they are generally reliable perceptions of judgment independent value, or 
whether there is indeed such a thing…So I am in agreement with Street that, from a 
Darwinian perspective, the hypothesis of value realism is superfluous—a wheel that 
spins without being attached to anything. From a Darwinian perspective, our 
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impressions of value, if construed realistically, are completely groundless. And if 
that is true for our most basic responses, it also true for the entire elaborate structure 
of value and morality that is build up from them by practical reflection and cultural 
development—just as scientific realism would be undermined if we abandoned a 
realistic interpretation of the perceptual experiences on which science is 
based…Nevertheless, I remain convinced that pain is really bad, and not just 
something we hate, and that pleasure is really good, and not just something we like. 
(109, 110) 
 
In the first place, I find the idea that “value realism” requires a strong metaphysical realism 
about the “goodness of pleasure” or the “badness of pain” extraordinary; truly, almost crazy. 
Morality is not about “detecting” some spooky entity, “goodness” “out there” (or one might 
say, “everywhere”). Morality is about devising a system of cooperation and conflict 
resolution that has a chance of meeting a reasonable conception of objectivity. Consider 
utilitarianism in this regard. I think Mill was about as robust an objectivist about morality as 
one could ask for. I cannot imagine a better candidate for the honorific title “moral realist.” 
Certainly, under Mill’s utilitarianism, there are objectively right answers about what to do, 
how to treat others, what our obligations are, and so forth. (Answers that are true 
independently of what any particular person professes to believe, certainly.) But it is just 
mad to think we have to care about whether pleasure is “really” good, pain “really” bad. 
What counts is that this sense of goodness, this appearance of goodness, this sense that 
each person typically has regarding the objects of his own desire, be equally respected, and 
that the moral calculus appropriately mirror or respect this fact. It is the equal respect of 
persons that counts, not the metaphysical correctness of their particular judgments or 
impressions. Indeed, we can, as utilitarians, be absolutely indifferent to assigning pain any 
metaphysical status at all and still be robust moral realists. After all, in any conflict between 
G.E. Moore and Jeremy Bentham, their desires would be counted equally in the utilitarian 
calculus, though one holds objectivist views about his judgments and the other subjectivist 
ones. They cannot both be right about that, of course, but so what? It does not matter who is 
right about the value of poetry, for example, or pushpin, or even if neither is. We can be 
objectivists about what fairness requires, or what justice requires all the same. This seems 
so obvious. Why can’t Nagel see it? For all that we must care about is that persons, as a 
matter of fact, do care about something, not whether in doing so they “hit upon” some 
“value” that is “true” apart from the judgment that claims it so.   
 
My point here is not unconnected to a further criticism. In the passage above, Nagel 
suggests that our judgments might, when developed, even be said to lead to a moral scheme 
that makes widespread social cooperation possible (and why not add: stable and transparent) 
and still such a scheme might for all that be systematically “false.” I find this suggestion 
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simply extraordinary, almost a reductio for an excessively Platonist construal of “value 
realism.” I am reminded of a very astute criticism Richard Wollheim once made against the 
institutional theory of art, the idea that whether an object was an object of art depended 
entirely on the say so of some institution. Wollheim pointed out that we could, consistent 
with this view, be able to say all sorts of properties were true of a novel (say), that it was, 
for example, well written, well plotted, imaginative, insightful, original, and so forth, and it 
still be an “open question” whether it was “a work of art,” because the relevant institution 
had not yet spoken. Here too, we seem to be able to say of a moral scheme that it happens to 
make stable cooperation possible; let us further say that it does so because it offers those 
within the scheme equal consideration and respect, and it does so in ways each can on 
reflection endorse…you get the idea. Just add as many accolades as you like — and it still 
“could be” “false.” Why not? These “values” that Nagel worries about it would seem can 
have nothing to do with the practical task of social cooperation, since that story, however 
rich, however Kantian, could be made congruent with the Darwinian one. So let us describe 
that story, the cooperation, in as rich a normative vocabulary as you like. Even in that 
society that is in compliance with Rawls’ two principles of justice, it appears we have no 
guarantee that we have, in constructing such a world, coincided with these “values” after all.  
 
But I take it as now obvious that we have here, in this argument, construed “morality” or 
“goodness” in exactly the wrong way, the way of the extreme intuitionist, where the idea of 
goodness is conceptually quite separate from human activity, and we can then, consistent 
with this separation, imagine the most transparent success in regulating such activity on the 
most egalitarian of terms and it “still” be “possible” that such a scheme is “wrong” or 
“false.” One wonders: what exactly is this stuff out there we may or may not be able to 
“detect” getting right? What do these values that we might be missing, busy as we are 
complying with the difference principle, do, exactly? I find it extraordinary that Nagel, so 
astute a commentator on Rawls and Dworkin, could approach the issue of moral objectivity, 
of moral realism, without considering the conception of objectivity that ties it to success at 
devising a conception of cooperation among free and equal persons, or more accurately, 
persons who conceive of themselves as such. Not only is that the more plausible conception 
of moral objectivity in its own right, it is of course the conception that dissolves any conflict 
between a Darwinian account of our development and our capacity to grasp morally 
objective principles. I guess that’s why it gets no attention. One might put the point in a 
Talmudic vein as follows: the essence of morality is just to treat the other as oneself. And to 
this one might add: how hard is that? I mean, our cognitive development might have 
stopped such that we ended up half as smart as we presently are, and as a result, all sorts of 
truths of physics would be invisible to us. But I would think we would still be smart enough 
to be moral, and to grasp the grounds of such morality. It’s not so hard Tom, and it certainly 
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isn’t that mysterious. Only a weird construal of “moral realism” or “moral facts” could have 
it otherwise.  
 
What Does It All Mean? 
 
Nagel has written a genuinely original and provocative book. But in the end it is also an 
unsatisfying one. His arguments are driven by conceptions of causation and science that are 
I think it is fair to say, somewhat idiosyncratic. As a result, explanations that are not 
straightforwardly tied to the language of physics (i.e., biology in so far as it is a special 
science) do not get adequately considered, and explanations that employ higher order 
properties in a central way are characterized as magical, unsatisfactory. He does not, in my 
view, seem to appreciate that contingency infects even the most systematic accounts of how 
the world happens to be, and he seems to be unable to imagine that a phenomenon so central 
to our lives and sense of ourselves might, for all that, be truly rare, and so not rightly 
thought as the “inevitable” result of the forces that govern our universe. But it is not just 
these views that I want to criticize, though obviously, I do think they are mistaken. It is 
rather their insufficient defense that is frustrating. The particular moves he makes on these 
issues (seeing causal explanation as satisfactory only if the properties in the outcome are 
somehow prefigured in the underlying states, for example) do not receive anything like the 
full exploration or defense that they deserve. He does turn a central issue of mind—how we 
are to explain consciousness?—into an issue for cosmology: how are we to fit mind into the 
most general scientific accounts we now think true? And this is a truly philosophically 
important thing to have done, to have framed the issue in these terms and so to have added 
to the debate about consciousness in this way. I just wish he had pursued this project with a 
bit more open mindedness towards those intuitions that are different from the ones he has.  
 
